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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH 
APPELLATE CASE NO: 930017-CA 
PRIORITY NO. 7 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and §63-46b-16(1)• 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A. Did the Industrial Commission of Utah ("the Commission") 
err when it issued a final decision in favor of the Utah 
Occupational Safety Division ("UOSH") , in view of the fact that the 
only issue before the Commission was the Magnesium Corporation of 
America's ("Magcorp") Motion For Summary Judgment? This issue 
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involves the Commission's adherence to proper decision making 
procedures and is reviewed under a "correction of error" standard 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(e). 
B. If the Commission's decision in this matter is 
procedurally defective, should the Court remand the matter to the 
Commission for correction of the procedural error. This issue is 
a question of general law, subject to this Court's plenary 
authority. King v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281, 
1285 (Utah App. 1993). 
C. As to Magcorp's challenge of the Commission's 
jurisdiction, was the Commission's extension of the period in which 
UOSH was required to file its Motion For Review supported by the 
evidence and permitted by applicable law? The question of the 
Commission's jurisdiction is one of general law, reviewed under a 
correction of error standard pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
16(4)(b). 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-l(9): 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to 
restrict a presiding officer, for good cause shown, from 
lengthening or shortening any time period prescribed in 
this chapter, except those time periods established for 
judicial review. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8: 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) 
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and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings, a 
hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all 
parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue, 
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal 
evidence. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-12f1): 
(1) (a) If a statute or the agency's rules permit 
parties to any adjudicative proceeding to seek review of 
an order by the agency or by a superior agency, the 
aggrieved party may file a written request for review 
within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purposes by the 
statute or rule. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-16(1): 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or 
the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final 
agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-16(4): 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, 
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure 
or decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or 
were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination 
of fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Utah Code Ann. S63-46b-17(b): 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; 
(iii)set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; 
or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further 
proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. S78-2a-3(2)(a): 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, 
except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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NATURE OF THE CASE, PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 
AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Magcorp,s brief correctly sets forth the proceedings before 
the Commission, as well as the facts and the nature of this case. 
For ease of reference, a summary of the facts that are particularly 
significant to the Commission's position are set forth below: 
UOSH cited Magcorp for certain safety violations, (R. 00001) 
Magcorp contested the citations (R. 00006) and the dispute was 
referred to an ALJ for adjudication. Magcorp filed a Motion For 
Summary Judgment asking the ALJ to dismiss the citations. (R. 
00014) On June 10, 1992, the ALJ signed an Order granting 
Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment with respect to one of the 
citations. (R. 00169) Magcorp then withdrew its opposition to 
the other citation. (R. 00314) 
Both Magcorp and UOSH were aware that the ALJ had signed his 
Order granting Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment on June 10, 
1992. (R. 00286) However, counsel for UOSH did not receive a copy 
of that Order. After several days, UOSH's counsel obtained a copy 
of the Order from the file. (R. 00226) The copy of the Order so 
obtained carried a Certificate of Mailing dated June 16, 1992. 
(R. 00175) 
On July 16, 1992, 30 days after the date on the Order's 
mailing certificate, UOSH filed its Motion For Review asking the 
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Commission to reverse the ALJ/s Order and to deny Magcorp's Motion 
For Summary Judgment. (R. 00177) Ultimately, the Commission 
issued an Order that not only denied Magcorp's Motion For Summary 
Judgment, but also affirmed the citations that had been imposed by 
UOSH against Magcorp. (R. 00336 to 340) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("the Commission") concedes 
that its decision in this matter is in error in some respects. 
In particular, the Commission erred in deciding the merits of 
this case when the only issue before it was Magcorp's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. While the Commission believes it properly denied 
summary judgment, it acknowledges that it should not have 
considered the underlying merits of the case. Instead, the 
Commission should have remanded the case to an ALJ for a full 
evidentiary hearing. 
The appropriate remedy for the Commission's error is remand of 
the case to the Commission for an evidentiary hearing and final 
decision. 
With respect to Magcorp's challenge to the Commission's 
jurisdiction, the Commission properly found that UOSH had good 
cause for its delay in filing its Motion For Review. For that 
reason, the Commission extended the period for filing, as permitted 
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by Utah's Administrative Procedures Act. The Commission therefore 
had jurisdiction to act upon the Motion For Review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN ISSUING A FINAL DECISION IN THIS 
MATTER• 
At the time the Commission issued its final decision, the only 
issue before it was UOSH's Motion For Review, arguing that the ALJ 
had erred when he granted Magcorp's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
In considering UOSH's Motion For Review, the Commission 
concluded that Magcorp was not entitled to summary judgment. 
Having made that determination, the Commission should have remanded 
the case to the ALJ for a full evidentiary hearing on the merits. 
Unfortunately, instead of remanding for further hearing, the 
Commission proceeded to consider and decide the underlying merits 
of the case. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8 sets forth minimum requirements for 
hearings in formal adjudications. Among those requirements are the 
opportunity to present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-
examination, and submit rebuttal evidence. The procedure followed 
in this case did not afford such opportunities to either party. As 
a result, neither Magcorp nor UOSH had an opportunity to fully 
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present its case to the initial decision maker or develop a record 
sufficient for judicial review. 
Under the foregoing circumstances, the parties have been 
substantially prejudiced by the Commission's decision, which should 
be set aside by this Court. D.B. v. Div. of Occupational 
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah App. 1989). 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT SHOULD REMAND THIS MATTER TO THE COMMISSION FOR 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-17(b) sets forth the types of relief 
which may be granted by this Court on judicial review of agency 
orders: 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(1) order agency action required by law; 
(2) order the agency to exercise its discretion as 
required by law; 
(3) set aside or modify agency action; 
(4) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency 
action; or 
(5) remand the matter to the agency for further 
proceedings. 
In this case, disputed questions of fact require an 
evidentiary hearing for resolution. The proceeding should 
therefore be remanded to the Commission for such a hearing, 
pursuant to §17(b)(5), above. 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT T1IF COMMISSION DOES HAVE 
JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER. 
This case presents a peculiar situation where the interplay of 
human error and a change in the law caused UOSH to file its Motion 
For Review beyond the 3 0 day period usually allowed for such 
filings by Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(a)(a). 
At the time this dispute arose, in June 1992, this Court had 
held that an administrative agency's order was "issued" when 
mailed. 
We hold that "issue" as used in section 63-46b-14(3)(a) 
means the date the agency action is properly mailed, as 
accurately evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or 
personally served. Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 
1199 (Utah App. 1992). 
Although UOSH knew that the ALJ had signed his Order on June 
10, 1992, the mailing certificate on the copy of the Order which 
UOSH finally obtained showed a date of June 16, 1992. In fact, the 
Order was never mailed at all. However, based on Wiggins, UOSH 
concluded that it had until July 16, 1992 to file its Motion For 
Review. UOSH met that deadline. 
In light of the foregoing, UOSH exercised reasonable care and 
diligence in filing its Motion For Review. While the ALJ's staff 
may have mishandled the issuance of the ALJ's Order and may have 
erred in dating the Order's mailing certificate, UOSH had no 
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control or knowledge of those errors. It had a right to rely on 
the date of indicated on the Order's mailing certificate. 
In a similar vein, UOSH reasonably relied on this Court's 
definition of "issued" in Wiggins and concluded that the ALJ's 
Order had been issued on June 16, 1992. Several months later, the 
Utah Supreme Court issued its decision in Dusty's. Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992) (per curiam). The 
Dusty's decision held that the date of issuance of an 
administrative agency order was not the date of mailing, but 
rather, the date on which it was signed. 
Under the definition of "issued" announced in Dusty's, UOSH 
should have filed its Motion For Review within 3 0 days of the date 
on which the ALJ signed his Order, instead of 3 0 days from the date 
on the Order's mailing certificate. However, if the Dusty's 
definition of "issued" is applied retroactively to the facts of 
this case, UOSH's actions will be judged according to a standard 
that did not exist at the time those actions were taken. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l(9) allows the Commission to extend 
the period for filing motions for review upon a showing of good 
cause. The Commission was cognizant of the foregoing circumstances 
when it concluded that UOSH had shown good cause for an extension 
of the filing deadline. The Court should likewise conclude that 
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good cause exists for extension of the filing deadline for UOSH's 
Motion For Review. 
As a final point, Magcorp argues that the Commission 
irrevocably lost jurisdiction to consider UOSH,s Motion For Review 
when UOSH failed to file a request for extension of the filing 
period within 3 0 days of the date on the ALJ's Order. Magcorp's 
argument is not supported by the plain language of Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-l(9), which states: 
Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a 
presiding officer, for good cause shown, from lengthening 
or shortening any time period prescribed in this chapter, 
except those time limits established for judicial review. 
Nothing in §63-46b-l(9) compels a conclusion that requests for 
extension must be filed within a particular time. In many cases, 
including the case at issue, the party who ultimately seeks an 
extension does not know that the extension is required until after 
the initial filing period is expired. 
The foregoing issue was implicit in Maverik v. Industrial 
Commission, 860 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1993). There, a party filed a 
Motion For Review with the Commission 31 days after the ALJ's 
Order—one day after the 3 0 day period for filing such Motions had 
expired. The Commission concluded that the party did not have good 
cause for missing the filing deadline and therefore refused to 
extend the filing deadline. The party then raised the issue on 
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appeal to this Court, arguing that the Commission had erred in not 
extending the filing deadline. 
The Maverik case is instructive to with respect to Magcorp's 
argument here. If, as Magcorp contends, a request for an extension 
of a filing period must be made during the original filing period, 
then the Court in Maverik would simply have dismissed Maverik's 
argument, since Maverik did not request an extension during the 
original filing period. However, this Court did not so rule. 
Instead, the Court considered the merits of Maverik,s claim for 
good cause for an extension, and concluded Maverik had not shown 
good cause. Such an analysis would be unnecessary if Magcorp's 
argument were correct. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission believes it properly 
considered and granted Magcorp's request for an extension. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, while the Commission believes it acted properly in 
denying Magcorp7s Motion For Summary Judgment, the Commission erred 
in also deciding the merits of this case. The case should be 
remanded for full evidentiary hearing and decision. 
As to the Commission's jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
1(9) allows the Commission to extend the period for filing motions 
for review, if good cause for extension is shown. Based on the 
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unusual circumstances of this case, the Commission properly 
extended the period for UOSH to file its Motion For Review. The 
Commission therefore had jurisdiction to rule on the Motion For 
Review. 
7 <? Dated this A''*Lv day of May, 1994. 
By. A JluSU. 
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused 2 rue and correct copies of 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH to be served upon 
Petitioner MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA by causing to be placed 
in an envelope addressed to the following: 
Jerrald D. Conder 
Attorney at Law 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
and said envelope was then deposited, sealed, with first class 
postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake 
City, Utah on the 2nd day of May, 1994. 
Alan Hennebold 
General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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ADDENDUM A 
15 
CITATION AND NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY 
Douglas J. McVey, Administrator 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Occupational Safety and Health Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 519870 
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0870 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 3 0 - 6 9 0 1 - F a x 5 3 0 - 6 8 0 4 
Issuance Oate 
Inspection Number 
CSH0 I.D 
: 9 / 3 / 9 1 
: 1 0 5 6 3 8 6 3 9 
: H 4 8 4 4 
Inspection Oate 
:7/30/91 - 8/9/91 
Inspection Site 
:Rowley, 84029 
To: Magnesium Corp. of America 
238 North 2200 West 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84116 
CITATION AN0 NOTIFICATION OF PENALTY: The violation(s) described in this Citation are alleged to have occurred 
on or about the day the inspection was made unless otherwise indicated in the description given below. This 
citation (or copy) must be posted at or near the location of alleged violation. The citation must be posted 
until the violation is corrected or abated or for 3 working days, whichever is longer. Assessed penalties are 
payable to the Industrial Commission unless a notice of contest is mailed to the Administrator as indicated 
below. 
CONTESTS AND APPEALS: Employers may request an informal review by the U0SH Administrator of any citation, 
proposed penalty or abatement period. Employees may request an informal review of the abatement period granted 
to the employer. Informal reviews do not stay the 30 days in which an employer must file a contest for a formal 
hearing before the Industrial Commission. 
The Industrial Commission will provide an adjudicative hearing if an employer files a written notice of contest 
with the Administrator within 30 days of receipt of the Citation or Proposed Penalties. Upon expiration of the 
30 day period the Citation and Proposed Penalties are final and not subject to review by any court or agency. 
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS: Any employee or representative of employees who believes that the periods of time fixed for 
correction or abatement of a violation is unreasonable has the right to contest the periods of time by 
submitting a letter to the Administrator within 30 days of issuance of the citation. 
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee filed a 
complaint with the division, instituted any proceeding with the division, conversed with a division 
representative, or testified in any proceeding or exercised any right afforded under the act, standards or rules 
of the division. Any employee who suffers adverse working conditions based on the above must contact the 
Administrator within 30 days. 
CITED ITEMS BEGIN ON FOLLOWING PAGE, AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE AND TOTAL PENALTIES APPEAR ON FINAL PAGE. 
00 ;Oi 
Description Oate Violation 
Must Be Abated 
Penalty 
OTHER 
1 
UGSO R500-405-558.2.7 
Solid decking shall be provided where a hazard exists of free flowing 
hot material falling from one floor to another. 
(A) Floor decking at Mag. Corp. such as, but not 
limited to the reactor building around the 
launder, where molten material could fall 
from floor to floor was not solid decking 
to eliminate the hazard of free flowing hot 
material 
30 days from 
receipt of 
citation 
$ 500 
Authorized signature: 
Date: '? '^?/ ^ 
Penalty $2,700 
V 
00103 
ADDENDUM B & C 
15 
JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709) 
of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
Fax: (801) 967-5563 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UOSH Inspection Number 105638639 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH ) 
BY AND THROUGH THE ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
HEALTH DIVISION, ) 
Complainant, ) 
vs • ) 
) Administrative Judge: 
MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF ) Donald L. George 
AMERICA, ) 
Respondent. ) 
Magnesium Corporation of America's (Magcorp) Motion for 
Summary Judgment came on regularly for hearing on the 17th day of 
April, 1992, the Honorable Donald L. George presiding. Magcorp 
was represented by counsel, Jerrald D. Conder and Michelle J. 
Ivie. Thomas C. Sturdy appeared on behalf of the Utah 
Dccupational Safety and Health Commission. Having reviewed the 
pleadings on file regarding the above-referenced motion and the 
~ourt having heard argument from each of the parties thereon, and 
Deing fully advised in the premises, now makes its Finding of 
?act and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
001.83 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That on August 27, 1991 Magcorp receivd a citation and 
notice of penalty for failure to require the use of flame 
resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and reactor 
sections of the facility in violation of 29 CFR 1910.132. 
2. That the citation and notice of penalty contained the 
following note: 
NOTE: NFPA 480-2-1.6 requires operators in melting 
and casting areas shall wear flame resistant 
clothing, non-foundry shoes and adequate 
face protection. 
3. That UOSHA agreed that NFPA 480-2-1.6 has not been 
codified into the Utah Administrative Code or other UOSHA 
regulations pertaining to personal protective equipment. 
4. A material issue of disputed fact exists with regard to 
whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 by not requiring the use 
of flame resistant protective clothing in the electrolytic and 
reactor sections of the facility. 
5. That the citation received by Magcorp contained an 
abatement order requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame 
resistant protective equipment required under the citation and 
notice of penalty. 
6. That the personal protective equipment at issue herein, 
to wit, coveralls, are uniquely personal to each individual 
employee at Magcorp since the coveralls are individually fitted 
-2-
to the employee, many bear the name of the individual employee, 
and the coveralls are the type of garment that may be used by 
employees away from the Magcorp facility. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That this court has jurisdiction over the parties in the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. That disputed material issues of fact exist with regard 
to whether Magcorp is in compliance with the requirements of 29 
CFR 1910.132(a) and Summary Judgment on that issue is therefore 
denied. 
3. That based upon the holding in Budd Co. v. OSHRC and 
Federal OSHA Mandate, UOSHA has no legal or other authority to 
impose the cost of uniquely personal protective equipment, such 
as the coveralls at issue herein, upon Magcorp. 
4. That the Abatement Order contained in the UOSHA citation 
to Magcorp requiring Magcorp to bear the cost of flame resistant 
coveralls purportedly required under 29 CFR 1910.132(a) is 
unenforceable and void as a matter of law. 
5. Summary Judgment is granted in favor of Magcorp on the 
issue of cost allocation under 29 CFR 1910.132(a). 
DATED this /Qjftday of JUx^* , 1992. 
Approved as to Form: 
Thomas C. Sturdy V ) 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of Mayf 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW to the following: 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Division of Legal Affairs 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
— A — . i \ O -*w **=v -:. 
»* &- tf' 
JERRALD D. CONDER (#0709) 
of CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 9 67-5500 
Fax: (801) 967-5563 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UOSH Inspection Number 105638639 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BY AND THROUGH THE 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH DIVISION, 
Complainant, 
vs. 
MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF 
AMERICA, 
Respondent, 
O R D E R 
Administrative Judge: 
Donald L. George 
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
entered herein, and for good cause appearing^ it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Magcorpfs Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on 
the issue of cost allocation for personal protective equipment 
required under 29 CFR 1910 • 132, and the abatement note contained 
in the citation and notice of penalty issued in connection with 
inspection no. 105638639, which required Magcorp to provide flame 
resistant coveralls to Magcorp employees at no cost or financial 
expense to the employees is void and unenforceable as a matter of 
law. 
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2. That disputed issues of material fact exist with regard 
to whether Magcorp violated 29 CFR 1910.132 and summary judgment 
on this issue is denied. 
, 1 9 9 2 . DATED t h i s fflj^day o f Q xJU<2 
V 
BY THE COURT: 
Passed by the Industrial Coomlssioa 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, thl« , 
/6'tf-jtey of Ou*~^< > 19 ?^.. 
ATj 
Commission Secretary^ ..tfl „ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
'O / ' 
Thomas C. S t u r d y 
• / / ' 
^ V v w V 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UOSH Inspection No, 105638639 
Industrial Commission of Utah * 
by and through the Occupational * 
Health and Safety Division, * 
Complainant, * 
vs. * 
Magnesium Corporation of * 
America, * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the 
Respondents Motion to Dismiss the Complainants Motion for Review 
of the administrative law judge's (ALJ) order dated June 10, 1992. 
The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 35-9-12, 
and Section 63-46b-12. 
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June 10, 
1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium Corporation of 
America (respondent or Magcorp) on the issue of whether the 
Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (UOSH) could place the cost of providing flame 
resistant coveralls for its employees on the respondent. The 
citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH required the 
respondent to provide flame resistent coveralls to its employees at 
no cost. The ALJ issued an order of summary judgment finding that 
the citation was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. The 
ALJ further found that there were disputed issues of material fact 
on the issue of whether the respondent violated 29 CFR 1910.13 2 for 
its failure to require the use of flame resistent protective 
clothing in the electrolytic and reactor sections of its facility. 
Although the order of the ALJ was signed on June 10, 1992, the 
mailing certificate shows that the order was mailed on June 16, 
1992. The UOSH filed a motion for review on July 16, 1992 pursuant 
to 63-46b-12 seeking review of the order of summary judgment. The 
respondent filed a motion to dismiss UOSH's motion for review for 
untimeliness. 
The respondent asserts that the ALJ's order was "issued" on June 
10, 1992 because the order was executed in front of the party/s 
attorneys and because Mr. Conder, attorney for Magcorp was 
personally served a copy of the order on that date. Mr. Conder 
then offered a copy of the order to Mr. Sturdy, counsel for UOSH. 
Mr. Sturdy declined Mr. Conder's offer of a copy of the order. No 
certificate of service was executed on June 10, 1992 when the order 
was delivered to Mr. Conder. 
As of June 16, 1992, Mr. Sturdy had not received a copy of the 
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order and requested a copy from the adjudication division- He 
received his copy of the order and a mailing certificate was 
executed on June 16, 1992. Subsequently, UOSH filed its motion for 
review on July 16, 1992. The respondent asserts that the motion 
for review was untimely filed and asks that it be dismissed. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has addressed the question of when an 
order constituting final agency action is issued. Wiggins v. Board 
of Review, 178 Ut^h Adv. Rep. 29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). In Wiggins, 
the court held that n/issue' as used in section 63-46b-14 (3) (a) 
means the date the agency action is properly mailed as accurately 
evidenced by the certificate of mailing, or personally served." 
This definition of "issue" can legitimately be applied to 63-46b-
12, the section of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act which 
governs agency review of adjudicative proceedings. 
This case involves an agency order which was signed and personally 
delivered to the respondent on June 10, 1992 without preparation of 
a mailing certificate. The complainant received the order with a 
mailing certificate which shows an issuance date of June 16, 1992. 
The date of issuance of an agency decision must be certain, 
otherwise the jurisdiction of the agency or court to review an 
agency order will be uncertain. 
In this case, the confusion over the date of issuance stems from 
the adjudication division's failure to properly prepare a 
certificate of mailing and place its order in the mail on the date 
the order was hand delivered to the respondent. However, to rule 
that the order was issued on June 10, 1992 when the certificate of 
mailing shows th^t the order was mailed on June 16, 1992 will 
unfairly prejudice the complainant who relied on the date on the 
mailing certificate in submitting its motion for review. The 
normal practice of the commission is to issue its orders by mail, 
therefore, we believe that the order was not properly "issued" on 
June 10, 1992 even though it was hand delivered to the respondent 
on that date. An order of the commission will not be considered 
to have been "issued" until the date it is mailed or hand delivered 
to the parties accompanied by a properly executed mailing 
certificate or certificate of service. The date on the mailing 
certificate or certificate of service will be considered to be the 
date the order was "issued" by the commission. We believe that 
this approach is consistent with the recent opinion of the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 178 Utah Adv. Rep. 
29 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). 
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ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the motion for review of the complainant in 
this matter was timely filed based upon the date of issuance of the 
order as reflected on the mailing certificate. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall be given 15 
days from the date of mailing of this order to file a response to 
the complainant's motion for review, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 63-46b-12. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
r^^^K^^^- / ^ <<^^^ 
Co? 
Certified this 
ATTg^T: 
lleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
1992, 
> a t n c i a 0. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Adell Butler-Mitchell, certify that I did mail by prepaid 
first class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the INTERIAM 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS in the case of Industrial 
Commission of Utah BY AND THROUGH THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND 
HEALTH DIVISION v.s MAGNESIUM CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Case Number 
105638369, on y 2^ t day of ^b^l^-'-^X , 197ol to the 
following: 
JERRALD D. CONDER, ATTORNEY 
4057 SOUTH 4000 WEST 
WEST VALLEY CITY UTAH 84120 
THOMAS STURDY, ATTORNEY 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION 
(intra-office mail) 
DONALD L. GEORGE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
(intra-office mail) 
JAY W. BAGLEY 
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH DIVISION 
(intra-office mail) 
^rrfU£U*JX 
Adell Butler-Mitchell 
Paralegal 
General Counsel 's Office 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah 
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ADDENDUM E 
15 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UOSH Inspection No. 105638639 
Utah Occupational 
Health and Safety Division, 
Complainant, 
vs. 
Magnesium Corporation of 
America, 
Respondent. 
**************************** 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (commission) reviews the 
Complainant's Motion for Review of the administrative law judge's 
(ALJ) Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order dated June 10, 
1992. The authority for review is conferred by U.C.A. Section 35-
9-12, and Section 63-46b-12. 
An ALJ of the Industrial Commission issued an order dated June 
10, 1992 granting summary judgment in favor of Magnesium 
Corporation of America ("respondent11 or "Magcorp") on the iss^ ue of 
whether the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah ("UOSH") could place the cost of 
providing flame resistant coveralls for its employees on \the 
respondent. The citation and notice of penalty issued by the UOSH 
required the respondeat to provide flame resistent coveralls to its 
employees at no cost. The ALJ issued an order granting the 
respondent's motion for summary judgment finding that the citation 
was void and unenforceable as a matter of law. On April 28, 1992, 
Magcorp withdrew its objection to the citation and tendered payment 
of the penalty due under the citation. Respondent's Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities, Exhibit C. 
The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act ("UOSHA") provides 
that the commission is "empowered to administer all laws and lawful 
orders to ensure that every employee in this state has a workplace 
free of recognized hazards." U.C.A. sec. 35-9-4 (1988). The 
commission has the "authority to assess all civil penalties 
provided in this section, giving due consideration to the 
appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the size of the 
business of the employer charged, the gravity of the violation, the 
good faith of the employer, and the history of any previous 
violations by the employer." 
I. WAS THE COST OF THE PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 
REQUIRED BY UOSH PROPERLY ALLOCATED TO THE 
RESPONDENT'S EMPLOYEES? 
The ALJ relied on Budd Co. v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 201 (1975) in 
ruling that the UOSH has no "legal or other authority to impose the 
cost of uniquely personal equipment, such as the coveralls herein, 
* 
* 
* ORDER GRANTING 
* MOTION FOR 
* REVIEW 
* 
* * * * * 
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upon Magcorp." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 3, June 
10, 1992. Budd held that 29 CFR 1910.132(a) did not mandate that 
employers bear the cost of protective footwear required by the 
regulation. 
29 CFR 1910.132(a) provides that: 
Protective equipment, including personal protective 
equipment [ffPPEM ] for eyes, face, head, and extremities, 
protective clothing, respiratory devices, and protective 
shields and barriers, shall be provided, used and 
maintained in a sanitary and reliable condition wherever 
it is necessary by reason of hazards of processes or 
environment, chemical hazards, radiological hazards, or 
mechanical irritants encountered in a manner capable of 
causing injury or impairment in the function of any part 
of the body through absorption, inhalation or physical 
contact (emphasis added). 
29 CFR sec. 1910.132. 
Subpart (b) provides that "where employees provide their own 
protective equipment, the employer shall be responsible to assure 
its adequacy, including proper maintenance, and sanitation of such 
equipment." Id. In a footnote, the OSH Commission noted: 
We do not imply that an employer is not obliged to bear 
the cost of things such as capital equipment which it is 
ordinarily his responsibility to assume. We are here 
considering the cost allocation of personal equipment. 
. . . Thus, the most universally used type of protection 
[steel toed shoes] is uniquely personal and may be used 
by the employee when he is away from the job (emphasis 
added). 
Id. n. 5. 
A U.S. Department of Labor memorandum dated August 9, 1985, 
discussed the issue of cost allocation for PPE. The memorandum 
stated that it will be the position of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration that 29 CFR 1910.132 will be interpreted as 
follows: 
PPE that is uniquely personal, and which the employees 
may well use away froit the job,, is the type that an 
employer may require em;: .oyees to pay for. Exactly who 
pays for this kind of PPE is a question to be resolved 
between the employer and his employees—it is an 
appropriate subject for collective bargaining. . . . as 
a broad guideline, we can conclude that an employee may 
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be required to pay for PPE that he alone will use, is of 
a personal nature, and may be used away from the job. 
OSHA Memorandum, August 9, 1985. 
Thus, the question at issue is whether the flame resistant 
coveralls required by UOSH are the type of PPE which is uniquely 
personal to the wearer. 
The UOSH asserts that the coveralls at issue are not uniquely 
personal to the wearer as are the steel toed shoes in Budd. The 
coveralls are sized like men's suits, i.e. 40, 42, etc., and many 
bear the employee's name. The UOSH asserts that the coveralls are 
contaminated with Fiberfrax, a carcinogenic ceramic fiber and 
should not be worn home prior to being laundered. The Material 
Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS") for Fiberfrax specifies in relevant part 
that: 
. . . ceramic fiber should be handled with caution. The 
handling practices described in this MSDS must be 
strictly followed . . . It is recommended that full body 
clothing should be worn to reduce the possibility of skin 
irritation. Washable or disposable clothing may be used. 
Do not take unwashed work clothing home. Work clothes 
should be washed separately from other clothing. Rinse 
washing machine thoroughly after use. If clothing is to 
be laundered by someone else, inform launderer of proper 
procedure clothes and street clothes should be kept 
separate to prevent contamination (emphasis added). 
MSDS at 6. 
The UOSH argues that the coveralls in question are not safe to 
be taken home or stored with other clothes without having first 
been laundered and therefore are not appropriate to be worn away 
from work. We agree that the MSDS requirements for laundering and 
sequestering contaminated clothing, make the coveralls more unique 
to the workplace than the individual employee. Magcorp has made 
coin operated laundry facilities available to its employees in 
order to address this concern. We believe that this response is 
inadequate to properly provide for the safety of Magcorp employees. 
The sizing of the coveralls in this case can be distinguished 
from the sizing of the shoes in Budd. Shoes, by their nature 
adjust and conform to the foot of the wearer becoming "uniquely 
personal" to the wearer. Coveralls, do not generally become 
"broken in" like a pair of shoes. The fit of a pair of coveralls 
is much less personal and unique than a pair of steel toed shoes. 
The coveralls may not be worn away from the workplace in the same 
manner as steel toed shoes because they are contaminated with 
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carcinogenic ceramic fibers. Due to the contamination, the 
coveralls must be laundered separately from other clothing and must 
be laundered before taking them home. We believe that PPE which an 
employee cannot readily wear home cannot realistically be 
considered "uniquely personal11 to the employee. 
The fact that the coveralls have the employee's name 
embroidered on them does not, in and of itself, make the coveralls 
uniquely personal to the wearer. Names on uniforms and work 
clothes can easily and inexpensively be changed to identify a new 
wearer. We do not believe that the sizing of the coveralls makes 
them unique to the wearer. Coveralls sized like men's suits could 
easily be shared among several employees as long as they are of the 
approximate same size. We therefore find that the flame resistant 
coveralls required by UOSH in Magcorp's "hot end" are not uniquely 
personal and that the cost of the coveralls should properly be 
borne by the employer. 
II. WAS SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROPER IN THIS CASE? 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
relevant part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. 
In the present case, the ALJ held a hearing on Magcorp's 
motion for summary judgment, heard argument and examined the 
coveralls at issue. The ALJ then found that the coveralls were 
uniquely personal protective equipment and concluded as a matter of 
law that the cost of the coveralls could be placed on the employees 
under the reasoning in Budd. The ALJ then issued findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and an order granting Magcorp/s motion for 
summary judgment. 
We don't believe that the order in this case should properly 
be classified as one of summary judgment because there were 
disputed questions of fact argued before the judge. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion for review of the 
complainant in this matter is hereby granted- For the reasons 
stated above, we find that the cost of the flame resistant 
coveralls required by UOSH should properly be allocated to the 
employer, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the employer shall provide, at no 
cost to its employees, laundry service for the protective coveralls 
that have been exposed to Fiberfrax as specified in the Material 
Safety Data Sheet. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16. The requesting party shall 
bear all costs for preparing a transcript for appeals purposes. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
<Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
I abstain because of prior discussion with 
possibly related to the issues in this case. 
corp officials 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Certified this /7&J day of /d^s^L^J 1992. 
ATTEST: 
^ ^ t ^ ) CO yfxJ. 
Patricia O. Asliby 
Commission Secretary 
0U34*J 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I c e r t i f y t h a t on rbjmvM, (7. /99Z- . I mailed the 
attached Order Granting Motion for Review i n t h e case of Utah 
Occupational Health and Safety Division v. Magnesium Corporation of 
America first class postage prepaid, to the following; 
Jerrald D. Conder, Esq, 
CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorney for Magcorp 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley Cityf Utah 84120 
Thomas C. Sturdy, Esq. 
Attorney for UOSH 
(hand delivered) 
Donald L. George, Esq. 
Administrative Law Judge 
(hand delivered) 
Sharon J, Eb^n, ^ Attorney 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
UOSH Inspection No, 105638639 
Industrial Commission of Utah * 
by and through the Occupational * 
Health and Safety Division, * 
Complainant, * 
vs. * 
* 
* 
Magnesium Corporation of * 
America, * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission11) reviews the 
Complainant's Motion for Extension of Time pursuant to the limited 
order of remand issued by the Court of Appeals on April 29, 1993. 
On June 10, 1992 Judge Donald L. Georgev ("ALJ") issued an 
order dismissing a citation issued by the Utah Occupational Safety 
and Health Division ("UOSH") in connection with UOSH inspection 
number 105638639. The citation assessed a fine for the 
Respondent's failure to provide flame retardant coveralls pursuant 
to 29 CFR 1910.132. At the time of the citation, the respondent 
required its employees to pay for flame retardant coveralls to be 
used in the workplace. The ALJ found that the citation was void 
and unenforceable as-a matter of law. On Motion for Review, the 
Commission reversed the ALJ and ruled that the employer should 
provide the flame retardant coveralls. 
The Commission's Order was appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Court remanded the matter to the Commission for a 
determination whether UOSH showed good cause for an extension of 
time to file its motion for review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-
1(9), Our prior orders have not addressed the issue of good cause 
for an extension of time because no extension was originally 
requested. Under the law in existence at the time UOSH filed its 
motion for review, the motion was timely filed. 
DISCUSSION 
1. GOOD CAUSE 
UOSH asserts that it relied in good faith on Wiggins v. Board 
of Review1 when it filed its motion for review. UOSH further 
asserts that both Dusty's Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n2 and Bonded 
1
 824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992). 
2
 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992). 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR 
EXTENSION OF TIME 
00533 
MAGCORP 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
Bicycle Couriers v. Dept. of Empl. Sec.,3 were decided after UOSH 
filed its motion for review on July 16, 1992. 
The UOSH motion for review was filed thirty days from the date 
the ALJ's Order was mailed relying upon the January 23, 1992 
decision of the Court of Appeals in Wiggins. Wiggins held that the 
date an agency order is issued is the date the order is mailed as 
evidenced by the mailing certificate. On October 30, 1992, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that an agency order is issued on the date 
the order bears on its face, and not the date of mailing. Dusty 's 
at 9. On December 4, 1992, the Court of Appeals in Bicycle 
Couriers, held that Dusty 's overruled Wiggins. 
Magcorp asserts that UOSH has not shown good cause to justify 
an extension of time under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
("UAPA"). Magcorp further asserts that the time for filing a 
motion for review is jurisdictional under Varian Eimac v. 
Lamoreaux4 and that there is no specific statutory provision which 
allows the Commission to extend the time for filing a motion for 
review. 
We believe that U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9) clearly authorizes the 
Commission to grant an extension of time for filing a motion for 
review for good cause shown. Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial 
Commission..s UAPA provides that an "aggrieved party may file a 
written request for review within 3 0 days after the issuance of an 
order..."6 and that an agency may extend the time limits provided 
for good cause shown.7 Maverik filed a motion for Commission 
review of an administrative order one day late. The Court of 
Appeals recognized that, "absent a showing of good cause for an 
extension, the term filing as used in section 63-46b-12 requires, 
as a prerequisite to the agency taking jurisdiction over a review, 
actual delivery of the necessary documents to the agency within the 
thirty day time period." Maverick at 37. (emphasis added). 
We conclude that the UOSH motion for review was timely filed 
under the law in effect at the time of filing and that no extension 
3
 201 Ut. Adv. Rep. (Ct. App. 1992). 
4
 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989), 
5
 214 Ut. Adv. Rep. 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1993). 
6
 U.C.A. § 63-46b-12(l)(a). 
7
 The agency may extend "any time period prescribed in this 
chapter, except those time periods prescribed for judicial review." 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(9). 
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of time was necessary. However, we also hold that if an extension 
of time is required then the subsequent change in the law 
constitutes good cause for an extension of time. 
2. APPLICABILITY OF UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Magcorp asserts that Rule 6 U.R.C.P. applies to the equation 
pursuant to Rule 81(d) U.R.C.P., and requires that UOSH show 
excusable neglect before an extension of time may be granted by the 
Commission. A showing of excusable neglect is not required. UOSH 
relied on the law in effect at the time of filing, so it is not 
necessary to show excusable neglect. 
We believe that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply 
to agency actions under UAPA unless UAPA provides otherwise. In 
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 300 P.2d 204 (Utah 1965), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e) and Rule 81(a) U.R.C.P. 
could be applied to administrative procedures "except insofar as 
such rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable." The Griffith 
Court held that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. applied to extend the time for 
filing a petition for rehearing when the notice was served by mail. 
Although footnote 1 in Lamoreaux opines that Rule 6(e) U.R.C.P. 
applies to extend the time for filing a motion for review, this 
position was discarded by the Court of Appeals in Mayerik.8 
In 1983, the Utah Supreme Court noted that ff[w]hile the mode 
of procedure before administrative bodies may conform to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing civil procedure in 
the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative 
proceedings. See e.g. Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1977) .... Thus, administrative 
proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
unless the governing statute or regulations so provide." Pilcher 
v. Dep't of Social Services, 663 P. 2d 450 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added). We believe that the rule articulated in Pilcher correctly 
determines the applicability of the U.R.C.P. to administrative 
proceedings in Utah. 
The UAPA provides in relevant part, "except as otherwise 
provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by 
specific reference to this chapter, the provisions of this chapter 
apply to every agency of the state of Utah..." U.C.A. § 63-46b-
1(1) (1989) (emphasis added). The UAPA does not generally state 
that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply to all administrative 
proceedings. To the contrary, the UAPA contains only limited, 
214 U t . Adv. Rep . 3 4 , 36-37 ( C t . App. 1 9 9 3 ) . 
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specific references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure9. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The ALJ's Order was issued on June 10, 1992 and mailed to 
the parties on June 16, 1992. 
2. The Utah Division of Occupational Safety and Health (UOSH) 
Motion for Review was filed with the Commission on July 16, 1992. 
3. Under the January 23, 1992 order in Wiggins v. Board of 
Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Ut. App. 1992), an agency order was 
considered issued on the date it was mailed. 
4. The Commission relied on the Wiggins decision in its 
Interim Order of October 9, 1992 which held that the UOSH motion 
for review was timely filed. 
5. The law regarding the issuance of agency orders was changed 
by the October 30, 1992 Order of the Utah Supreme Court in Dusty's 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 199 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 9 (Utah 1992). 
Under Dusty's, an order is considered issued on the date the order 
bears on its face. 
6. The UOSH relied in good faith on the Wiggins decision in 
filing its motion for review on July 16, 1992. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Wiggins was the law in effect at the time UOSH filed its 
motion for review. We believe that UOSH's reliance on the law at 
the time of filing is good cause to support the grant of an 
extension of time for filing. 
9
 See U.C.A. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (providing that Rules 12(b) and 
56 U.R.C.P. apply to motions to dismiss or for summary judgment 
except to the extent that those rules are modified by UAPA); U.C.A. 
§ 63-46b-7 (providing that the rules of discovery under the 
U.R.C.P. apply if the agency has not enacted rules for discovery); 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-ll(3) (providing that a defaulted party may file a 
motion to set aside a default order under the procedures outlined 
in the U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-15(2) (providing that a petition 
for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be 
a complaint governed by the U.R.C.P. and that all other pleadings 
and proceedings in the district court are governed by the 
U.R.C.P.); U.C.A. § 63-46b-19(l)(c) (providing that the venue for 
proceedings to enforce agency orders is governed by the 
requirements of the U.R.C.P.). 
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We conclude that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not 
apply to agency actions under UAPA unless expressly adopted under 
UAPA. Therefore, UOSH must merely show good cause for an extension 
under UAPA and does not need to meet the requirements of Rule 6 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the complainant in this matter is 
hereby granted an extension of time in which to file a motion for 
review of the June 10, 1992 order of the administrative law judge. 
DATED this <P>0 day of OrZZ 1993. 
\y^ 
Stephen M. 
Chairman 
Had 
yu 
ey 
^ 2 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
I abstain because of prior discussion with Magcorp officials 
possibly related to the issues in this cgrse. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
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JERRALD D. CONDER 
PETER L. ROGNLIE 
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WEST VALLEY CITY, UTAH 84120 
DONALD L. GEORGE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
Adell Butle^Mitchell 
Paralegal 
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